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We ﬁnd that IPOs issued in more competitive, and more highly leveraged,
industries underperform in the three years following their issuance. Both re-
sults are economically large, and are robust to numerous controls. We conduct
several tests to trace the economic sources of this underperformance. Al-
though explanations are not mutually exclusive, our evidence most strongly
supports an explanation based on the information content of IPOs: observing
the decision to issue an IPO reveals information about an industry’s future
organization, and investors ignore this information when valuing ﬁrms. The
logic is along the lines of Myers and Majluf (1984), and it suggests that a sim-
ple corporate ﬁnancing decision (issuing an IPO) may contain value-relevant
information about an entire industry’s future organization. This embedded
information is relevant to both IPO ﬁrms and existing ﬁrms alike.
2Many researchers believe that competitive industry conditions can impact ﬁnan-
cial structures.1 Our paper explores whether activity in the IPO market contains
information regarding an industry’s future organization, and whether this informa-
tion is correctly priced.2 We examine a large sample of IPOs issued from 1984 to
2000, and ﬁnd that IPOs in the highest industry concentration quartile experience
three-year post-IPO abnormal returns of –26.2%, compared to +14.9% for those in
the lowest quartile. This 42.1% diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level,
robust to four diﬀerent asset pricing models (both in event time and calendar time,
and against diﬀerent benchmark returns), and to inclusion or exclusion of the late
1990s.3 Moreover, this result is economically large, and its corresponding 12% annual
return exceeds even the equity premium observed during this time.
In addition to reporting this novel ﬁnding, we conduct several tests to explore its
economic sources. We examine both rational explanations, and explanations based
on behavioral theory. Although possible explanations are not mutually exclusive, and
more than one may apply, our evidence most strongly supports a mispricing expla-
nation based on the information content of IPO issuance: observing the decision to
issue an IPO reveals information about future industrial organization, and investors
systematically overlook this information. This explanation becomes especially clear
from the industrial organization perspective.
It is well known among scholars of industrial organization that ﬁrms in concen-
trated industries face less competition from rivals, and typically enjoy relatively high
proﬁt margins. In practice, high proﬁt margins can only persist in equilibrium when
rivals cannot enter due to (1) high costs of entry, (2) economies of scale, or (3) legal
1Early theory developed by Brander and Lewis (1986) and Maksimovic (1988) studies the in-
teraction between existing ﬁrms in concentrated industries. Later theory presented by Maksimovic
and Zechner (1991), Williams (1995), and Fries, Miller, and Perraudin (1997) shows that, in com-
petitive industries, ﬁrms also account for the collective actions of their industry peers when making
real and ﬁnancial decisions. Chevalier (1995) and Phillips (1995) provide empirical evidence of this
link between ﬁnancial structures and product markets. MacKay and Phillips (2003) ﬁnd empirical
support for the aforementioned competitive industry models of ﬁnancial structure.
2We are aware of only one existing paper that touches upon this link: Benninga, Helmantel,
and Sarig (2003) model a ﬁrm’s decision to go public and to re-privatize. One implication of their
model is that IPOs tend to cluster in industries because ﬁrm-level cash ﬂows are more correlated
within industries.
3Although more noise is added when the late 1990s are included, the diﬀerence is still exceeds
40%. Moreover, this diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the 1% level with or without the late 1990s.
3(i.e. patent) protection. Hence, high proﬁt equilibria can be unstable in a dynamic
economy, and observing successful entry should alert investors to the possible col-
lapse of these long-standing barriers to entry.4 Because the removal of barriers to
entry permits rivals to enter (perhaps in larger numbers), investors should down-
wardly revise their beliefs about future proﬁts, and drive down stock prices after
observing entry in a concentrated industry. This price correction should be large, as
successful entry by even a single ﬁrm likely implies that several additional ﬁrms may
soon enter, so the expected increase in competition can be dramatic.
From a theoretical perspective, this logic mirrors Myers and Majluf (1984), who
show that observing a corporate ﬁnance decision (i.e. issuing equity) contains value-
relevant information about a ﬁrm’s growth options. In our case, a similar corporate
ﬁnancing decision (issuing an IPO) contains value-relevant information about an
entire industry, not just a single ﬁrm. If investors ignore this industry-wide infor-
mation, the aforementioned downward price correction would be delayed, and would
appear as negative long-term abnormal returns. Our empirical results fully support
the notion that investors overlook this information: (1) IPOs in concentrated indus-
tries experience inferior long-term abnormal performance, (2) existing public ﬁrms
in these same industries underperform by just as much as the IPO ﬁrms, (3) Concen-
trated industries experiencing zero IPOs do not underperform, and (4) IPO volume
is higher in concentrated industries (consistent with the expectation of multiple en-
trants when barriers to entry fail).
Given well-known facts regarding how today’s investors value ﬁrms, it is easy
understand why this information may be overlooked. Arkebauer and Schultz (1991)
and Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) suggest that underwriters and investors
alike value ﬁrms using comparable ﬁrm ratios. One feature is that these ratios are
based on current proﬁt levels (primarily due to availability). Hence, investors using
ratios to value IPO ﬁrms (in concentrated industries) are assuming that they will
enjoy the same high proﬁt margins enjoyed by existing ﬁrms prior to the failure of
the barriers to entry. This form of valuation error would later correct over time in
4For example, technological innovation or changes in the legal environment can render patents
to be irrelevant, lower the costs of entry, or destroy economies of scale.
4the form of negative abnormal returns, which is exactly what we observe.
Although the “unpriced information” hypothesis receives most support, possible
explanations are not mutually exclusive, and a risk-based explanation cannot be
ruled out. The most plausible is motivated by Gort and Klepper (1982), Jovanovic
(1982), Klepper and Grady (1990), Klepper (1996), and Maksimovic and Phillips
(2004) among others, who suggest that industries go through life cycles. In bad
times, competitive industries are more likely to consolidate, and ﬁrms are more
likely to become distressed. Hence, ﬁrms in competitive industries may be exposed
to (systematic) macroeconomic risk, and ﬁrms in concentrated (non-competitive)
industries may be hedges to this risk. This explanation would (correctly) predict
that ﬁrms in competitive industries will have higher expected returns than ﬁrms
in concentrated industries. However, this explanation has diﬃculty explaining why
the underperformance we report is conditional on IPOs being issued, and why IPO
volume is also linked to industry concentration.
Since Ritter (1991)’s seminal paper, a few studies have identiﬁed variables that
can predict long-term performance in cross section. For example, Carter, Dark, and
Singh (1998) show that IPOs underwritten by higher prestige underwriters, and Jain
and Kini (1994) show that issuers who retain larger equity shares, experience superior
performance. Ritter (1991) and Lowry (2003) show that IPO volume matters, and
Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (1999) and Houge, Loughran, Suchanek, and Yan
(2001) show that the level of ﬂipping by institutional investors matters. Teoh, Welch,
and Wong (1998) show that long-term performance is related to the level of earnings
manipulation. We control for several of these results and document that our industry
concentration and industry leverage eﬀects are unique.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section I, we introduce our
empirical setup. Section II examines IPO underpricing and identiﬁes the sources of
industry eﬀects. Section III presents results for long-term IPO performance. Section
IV considers IPO volume, and section V concludes.
5I Data and Methodology
A Data Source
IPO data are from the Securities Data Company (SDC) U.S. New Issues Database.
The sample initially consists of all U.S. IPOs issued between January 1, 1984 and
December 31, 2000. We eliminate ADRs, unit issues, REITs, ﬁnancial ﬁrms, and
ﬁrms with oﬀer prices less than ﬁve dollars. An IPO’s industry is identiﬁed by its
three-digit SIC code, as reported by CRSP. 4,980 IPO observations remain in 324
industries. On average, 92 of the 324 industries experience at least one IPO in a
given year. The subsequent IPO stock performance data and ﬁrm ﬁnancial data
are from CRSP and COMPUSTAT respectively. Throughout this section, we use
“existing public ﬁrms” to refer to the set of non-IPO ﬁrms existing in the CRSP and
COMPUSTAT databases for at least one full year.
B Long-Term Performance
In light of views presented in Ritter and Welch (2002),5 we construct long-term
abnormal returns using many asset pricing models to ensure the robustness of our
results. Since Ritter (1991), buy-and-hold abnormal returns have been a mainstay for
researchers measuring long-term performance. Barber and Lyon (1997) reﬁne this
method and advocate style-matched buy-and-hold abnormal returns. In contrast,
Fama (1998) argues that formal inferences about long-term returns should be based
on cumulative abnormal returns because the buy-and-hold method exacerbates the
“bad-model problem”.6 Schultz (2001) suggests that calendar time portfolios, which
weight each time period equally (rather than each IPO equally), should be examined
to control for bias associated with pseudo-market-timing. Our study does not take
a stand on which methodology, and which asset pricing model is preferable. Rather,
to ensure robustness, we (1) present results using ﬁve diﬀerent asset pricing models
5The authors argue that results concerning long-term performance often depend on speciﬁc asset
pricing models.
6As famously argued by Fama (1998), any test for market eﬃciency is also a joint test of the
underlying asset pricing model. This is referred to as the “bad model problem”.
6including one based on calendar time, and (2) present results for samples that include
and exclude the late 1990s. We summarize the methodology as follows.
Raw Buy and Hold Return: An IPO’s raw buy and hold return is the total
return realized by an investor who purchases shares at the closing price on the
ﬁrst day of public trading, and then sells them on the earlier of (1) its three
year anniversary, or (2) the date on which the ﬁrm exits the CRSP database.
Style Matched Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns: Raw buy and hold return
minus the buy and hold return of a style matched portfolio. Style-matched
portfolios are based on 10 size and 5 book to market NYSE breakpoints. The
same breakpoints also identify which portfolio is assigned to a given IPO. We
obtain IPO market value and book values using information that is fully known
by the IPO date. An IPO’s market value is its number of shares (including
primary and secondary) times its IPO price. Its book value is obtained from
one of two sources: (1) 40% have COMPUSTAT data available prior to the
IPO date, and (2) the SDC database lists the book value of equity (including
new IPO proceeds) for the remaining 60%.
Style Matched Cumulative Abnormal Returns: We use the same matching
methodology as above. However, this method is based on the sum of the 36
monthly IPO returns less the sum of the 36 matched portfolio returns. When a
ﬁrm exits the database early, the sum only includes the available observations.
Style Matched Calendar Time Abnormal Returns: We use the same match-
ing methodology as above. However, this method assigns each IPO to a port-
folio based its industry’s ex-ante concentration or leverage. Each portfolio’s
monthly return is the equal weighted average over the IPOs included in its
deﬁnition. To test whether calendar time returns are signiﬁcant, we apply sta-
tistical tests to each portfolio’s monthly returns, not to individual IPO returns.
Firms enter calendar time portfolios in the month of their IPO, and exit after
their third anniversary.
7Fama-French Three Factor Abnormal Returns: We compute the intercept of
a time series regression of each IPO’s monthly returns (less the riskless rate)
on the three Fama and French (1993) factors: market factor, the HML factor,
and the SMB factor.7
Industry Adjusted Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns: This quantity is equal
to an IPO’s raw return less the average buy and hold return of all existing public
ﬁrms in the given IPO’s three digit SIC industry.
C Explanatory Variables
To study the role of industry conditions in the IPO market, we construct industry-
speciﬁc averages of variables that are related to industrial organization, and to corpo-
rate ﬁnancing decisions such as capital structure. Although not critical to our results,
industry averages can be viewed as proxies (or targets) for the values associated with
the IPO ﬁrms themselves.
The industry characteristics (such as industry leverage or book-to-market) used
in our study are averages over existing public ﬁrms in a given three-digit SIC code.
For an IPO issued in year t, these averages are taken over data from each existing
ﬁrm’s ﬁscal year that ends in the twelve-month period between July of year t-2 to
June of year t-1. This conservative lagging structure ensures that all data used to
predict IPO variables are at least six months old, and thus public information. We
consider the following industry conditions:8
Leverage Ratio: We identify a ﬁrm’s outstanding debt as the sum of its book
value of short-term debt [COMPUSTAT 9] and long-term debt [COMPUSTAT
34]. Its equity is its CRSP market capitalization at the end of its ﬁscal year. A
ﬁrm’s leverage ratio is its debt divided by its debt plus equity. An industry’s
leverage ratio is the equal-weighted average over its existing public ﬁrms.
7Not reported, we also include momentum in an additional speciﬁcation. It does not change our
results.
8In addition to the industry averages listed, we also test tax variables such as Graham’s modiﬁed
tax rate (see Graham 2000). Tax variables are not presented because they are not relevant in
predicting IPO performance or IPO volume.
8Log of Book-to-Market: A ﬁrm’s book-to-market ratio is its book value of equity
[COMPUSTAT 60] plus balance sheet deferred taxes [COMPUSTAT 35], all
divided by its CRSP market capitalization at the end of its ﬁscal year. An
industry’s book-to-market ratio is the equal-weighted average over its existing
public ﬁrms. Rajan and Zingales (1995) show that the book-to-market ratio is
related to capital structure.
Proﬁtability (Income-to-Sales Ratio): Proﬁtability is the ratio of operating
income [COMPUSTAT 13] divided by sales [COMPUSTAT 12]. After win-
sorizing at the 10% level in each year, an industry’s income-to-sales ratio is
the equal-weighted average over its existing public ﬁrms. Shyam-Sunder and
Myers (1999) document that proﬁtability is related to capital structure.
Sales-weighted industry concentration (HHI): Concentration is computed as
the Herﬁndahl Index (sum of squared market shares) based on all existing
public ﬁrms. A ﬁrm’s market share is its sales [COMPUSTAT 12] divided by
the total sales of all existing public ﬁrms in the given industry. Each ﬁrm’s
COMPUSTAT sales are from its ﬁscal year that ends between July of year t-2
and June of year t-1.
Size-weighted industry concentration (HHI): Concentration is computed as
the Herﬁndahl Index (sum of squared market shares) based on the market
capitalization of all existing public ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm’s market share is its CRSP
market capitalization divided by the total market capitalization of all existing
public ﬁrms in its given industry. Because CRSP market capitalization data
are available on a monthly basis, for consistency, we base this calculation on
data from the December of year t-2.
Log of Firm Market Cap: A ﬁrm’s market capitalization is its CRSP mar-
ket capitalization the December of year t-2. To control for growing ﬁrm size
throughout the sample, each value is scaled by the value of the S&P index at
the start of the given year.9
9Results do not change if sizes are not normalized by the S&P index level.
9Prior IPO Volume: The total number of IPOs completed in the given industry in
year t-1, divided by the number of existing public ﬁrms in the given industry
at the end of year t-2.
Equity Volatility: A ﬁrm’s equity volatility is the standard deviation of its twelve
monthly stock returns from July of year t-2 to June of year t-1. An industry’s
equity volatility is the equal-weighted average over all existing public ﬁrms.
Share Turnover: For a given ﬁrm, share turnover is the average of its twelve
monthly observations of share volume from July of year t-2 to June of year
t-1, divided by shares outstanding at the end of year t-2. An industry’s share
turnover is the equal-weighted average over all existing public ﬁrms. Gervais,
Kaniel and Mingelgrin (2001), among others, show that trading volume can
predict returns, so we include it as a control.
Prior Returns: A ﬁrm’s prior return is its realized CRSP return in year t-1. An
industry’s prior return is the equal-weighted average over its existing public
ﬁrms.
The measures of industry concentration used in our study are based on public
ﬁrms only due to limited data availability (sales and market value data are not
available for privately held ﬁrms). We believe concentration based on public ﬁrms
alone should be representative of an industry’s overall concentration. In addition, the
observation of a private ﬁrm going public can be viewed as a proxy for entry because
(1) IPO ﬁrms typically sell both primary and secondary shares, thus expanding the
overall size of the IPO ﬁrm within its industry. (2) Observed IPOs indicate an
industry is expanding, and this event is likely correlated with the entry of additional
private ﬁrms. In either case, industry concentration should decline when IPOs are
issued, and the concentration of public ﬁrms alone is a reasonable proxy for an
industry’s true concentration.
Our study focuses on the predictability of after market IPO stock performance
in the three years after issuance. Hence, we also control for the following variables,
which are identiﬁed in the existing literature as known predictors of long-term per-
10formance:
CMrank: Carter Manaster Rank from Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998), and up-
dated by Jay Ritter. This measure of underwriter quality was ﬁrst employed
in Carter and Manaster (1990), and Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) show that
this variable is a signiﬁcant predictor of long-term IPO performance.
Overhang: Shares retained by the entrepreneur (for all classes) divided by shares
ﬁled (including primary and secondary shares). The importance of this mea-
sure was ﬁrst noted in Barry (1989), and Jain and Kini (1994) show that it
signiﬁcantly predicts long-term IPO performance.
PriorIR30: Average initial return of IPOs issued in the 30 days before the issue
date. Ritter and Welch (2002) suggest that past initial returns predict long-
term performance in some samples, but this result is driven by the late 1990s.
LogSize: Natural logarithm of the original ﬁling amount. This variable is not
known to predict long-term performance, and we include it as a control.
D Summary Statistics
[Insert Table I here]
Table I presents summary statistics for the 4,980 IPOs from 1984 to 2000. The
table shows that average three-year returns are methodology dependent, and range
from –9.6% for industry adjusted abnormal returns, to +8.4% for the Fama-French
abnormal returns. These results conﬁrm that, when the late 1990s are included, it is
not clear whether or not IPOs underperform unconditionally, as discussed in Ritter
and Welch (2002). Although unconditional performance is an interesting question,
it is outside the scope of our study, as we focus on the role of industry conditions.
Unlike the unconditional result, we will show that two industry conditions can predict
long-term returns in cross section, and that their ability to do so is not methodology
dependent. The table also shows that buy and hold abnormal returns experience
greater volatility and skewness than cumulative abnormal returns. For example, style
11matched buy and hold abnormal returns have nearly twice the standard deviation of
style matched cumulative abnormal returns.
The table also shows that average ﬁrst day returns (initial returns) in the sample
are 20.9%, with a standard deviation of 45.3%. The average Carter Manaster rank
of the lead underwriter is 7.2, and the average overhang is 2.9. These results roughly
match those reported in other studies (see Bradley and Jordan (2002) for example).
The table also displays summary statistics for the industry averages used in our
study. The average HHI is 24.3% based on market capitalization, and 21.4% based
on sales. Because the table’s statistics are transaction weighted, the 20% standard
deviation of both concentration measures shows that ﬁrms actively issue IPOs in
both concentrated and non-concentrated industries. The average industry leverage
is 21.7%, indicating that ﬁrms tend to go public in industries with relatively low
leverage.10
[Insert Table II here]
Table II reports Pearson correlation coeﬃcients. It shows that both measures of
concentration, Size HHI and Sales HHI, are mutually correlated at 85.5%. Hence,
it is not surprising that our results are robust to both methodologies for computing
concentration. Although Sales HHI is more common in the industrial organization
literature, Size HHI is more ﬂexible because it can be computed on a monthly basis
(due to data availability), and may be more relevant because it reﬂects a more
forward looking view of an industry’s competitive landscape. This follows because
a ﬁrm’s market capitalization is the discounted value of its future cashﬂows. In
contrast, a ﬁrm’s sales reﬂects its current state, and may have little meaning for
growth industries. The table also shows that concentration correlates little with other
industry variables, with the exception of IPO volume (45.3%). This is consistent with
the result that industry concentration is a signiﬁcant predictor of future IPO volume,
which we report in section III.
Unlike concentration, industry leverage is more strongly correlated with other
10Reported summary statistics are transaction weighted. The average leverage of non IPO ﬁrms
is nearly 30%, indicating that IPOs are indeed more likely in lower leverage industries.
12variables: 61.1% with book to market, -49.9% with turnover, -36.8% with equity
volatility, and 34.2% with proﬁtability. Hence, we more carefully test our results
concerning industry leverage to rule out multi-collinearity. As we demonstrate later
in our study, industry leverage is a signiﬁcant predictor of long-term returns, while
the other industry characteristics generally are not. This result is robust to (1) four
methodologies for computing long-term returns, and (2) regression speciﬁcations that
examine robustness to multi-collinearity.
II Long-Term IPO Performance
Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) document that IPO ﬁrms underper-
form in the long run relative to market-wide benchmarks. However, Eckbo and Norli
(2001) and Ritter and Welch (2002) show that non-IPO ﬁrms with characteristics
similar to IPO ﬁrms also perform poorly in the long-term. We do not take a posi-
tion on whether IPOs unconditionally underperform in the long run. Instead, the
goal of this section is to identify industry-speciﬁc factors that can explain long-term
performance in cross section.
A Results
[Insert Table III here]
Table III presents the average three-year post-IPO abnormal return of IPOs
grouped into quartiles based on various industry characteristics. Adopting method-
ologies from Barber and Lyon (1997), Fama (1998), Rau and Vermaelen (1998),
and Schultz (2001), we consider four methodologies for computing abnormal returns:
style-matched buy-and-hold abnormal returns, Fama-French three-factor abnormal
returns, style-matched cumulative abnormal returns, and style-matched calendar-
time abnormal returns. By considering a ﬁfth measure, industry-matched buy-and-
hold abnormal returns,11 we are able to test whether IPO ﬁrms in each group perform
11We require ﬁrms to be public for at least one year before they are included in industry bench-
mark portfolios.
13better or worse than existing public ﬁrms in their corresponding three-digit SIC in-
dustries.
Panels A and B of Table III display long-term performance versus ex-ante indus-
try concentration for IPOs issued between 1984 and 2000. Panel A shows that IPOs
issued in industries in the lowest concentration quartile (based on market capitaliza-
tion) outperform those issued in the highest concentration quartile by 41.1% style-
matched buy-and-hold abnormal returns, 49.7% style-matched cumulative abnormal
returns, 36.6% Fama-French three-factor abnormal returns, and 32.8% style-matched
calendar time abnormal returns. Moreover, the results are similar in magnitude re-
gardless of whether the late 1990s (1998-2000) are included or excluded from the
sample. Panel B shows that these return diﬀerentials, although somewhat smaller
in magnitude, are also robust to using sales weighted HHI rather than size weighted
HHI. All diﬀerences are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. We conclude that IPOs in high
concentration industries routinely underperform IPOs in less concentrated industries.
Although not displayed, we can also report that the results are robust to using the 48
Fama-French industries rather than three digit SIC industries. Because size weighted
HHI results are somewhat stronger, the table suggests that a more forward-looking
view of industry concentration is most relevant.12
Unlike abnormal returns based on the other four asset pricing models, Table
III shows that industry concentration does not sort industry-matched buy-and-hold
abnormal returns. We conclude that existing public ﬁrms within concentrated indus-
tries perform just as poorly as the IPO ﬁrms themselves (conditional on the existence
of recent IPO ﬁrms in the given industry).13 The table also shows that industry con-
centration does not signiﬁcantly sort issuer size or initial IPO returns. We conclude
that the role of concentration cannot be explained by size eﬀects.14
12Sales weighted concentration reﬂects current sales. Because a ﬁrm’s market value is a weighted
sum of its future cash ﬂows, market capitalization based HHI can be viewed as a forward looking
measure of concentration, reﬂecting expectations about future sales.
13It is important to note that the reported averages are equal-weighted over IPOs. Thus, we do
not conclude that concentrated industries underperform in general. Rather, we only conclude that
existing public ﬁrms residing in concentrated industries underperform when a positive number of
IPOs are observed. This matter is explored further in section B.
14Several additional steps have been taken to assure readers that the concentration eﬀect cannot
be explained by size eﬀects. We ﬁnd that industry concentration is just as weakly correlated with
average ﬁrm size within its industry, as it is with average IPO size. In Table IV, we conﬁrm
14Panels C and D of Table III show that diﬀerences in HHI are less relevant than
HHI levels in predicting long-term performance. However, the results suggest (at
the 5% to 10% level rather than the 1% level) that industries experiencing increasing
competition (decreasing HHI) experience inferior long-term performance. One reason
for the weaker diﬀerence results in Panels C and D relative to the levels in Panels
A and B is that the competitive impact of observed IPO issuance may not become
visible in diﬀerences, for months, or even years, after IPOs are completed. This result
also suggests that the act of observing successful IPOs is more important than the
size of the observed IPOs, consistent with the notion that the act of issuance (not
the size of issuance) has information content, as discussed. This matter is discussed
further in section D. For the remainder of this study, we restrict our attention to
HHI levels.
Panel E of Table III shows that ﬁrms residing in high leverage industries under-
perform those in low leverage industries. In particular, IPOs in the highest industry
leverage quartile experience abnormal returns that are 26% to 52% lower than IPOs
residing in the lowest leverage quartile. As with the concentration eﬀect reported
in Panels A and B, the relationship between leverage and industry-matched buy-
and-hold abnormal returns is not signiﬁcant, so existing public ﬁrms within highly
leveraged industries perform just as poorly as the IPO ﬁrms themselves (conditional
on the existence of IPO ﬁrms).15 Panel E also shows that there is a positive rela-
tionship between industry leverage and issuer size. However, later in this section we
show that, even after controlling for issuer size, the ability of leverage to predict long-
term abnormal performance remains robust. Unlike industry concentration, industry
leverage shows some ability to sort initial returns, and highly leveraged industries
generally experience IPOs with lower initial returns.
Panel F of Table III shows that industry-speciﬁc equity volatility also predicts
long-term IPO performance. Firms in more volatile industries tend to outperform
those in less volatile industries, and this result is robust to including or excluding the
that concentration, not industry-speciﬁc ﬁrm size, explains long-term IPO performance. Based on
additional robustness checks (not reported), we also ﬁnd that underwriter size does not matter.
15Similarly, we do not conclude that high leverage industries unconditionally underperform low
leverage industries. Rather, they underperform conditional on the existence of IPOs in the given
high leverage industry.
15late 1990s. However, Panel F also shows that this result is weaker using calendar-
time abnormal returns. Hence this result should be interpreted with caution, as
the superior performance of ﬁrms in volatile industries may (in part) be driven by
pseudo market timing, and the clustering of IPOs in hot markets. In contrast, the
concentration and leverage eﬀects reported in Panels A, B, and E are entirely robust
to calendar time methods, and cannot be explained by pseudo market timing.
Panels G and H conﬁrm the results documented in Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998)
and Jain and Kini (1994), that IPOs underwritten by more prestigious underwriters,
and IPOs issued by entrepreneurs who retain more shares, experience superior long-
term performance. The panels also show that the Carter Manaster Rank is the most
economically important predictor of long-term returns. However, industry concen-
tration, industry leverage, and shares retained by the issuer are also economically
large, with abnormal return diﬀerentials of roughly 30% to 40%. Both the “industry
concentration eﬀect’, and the “industry leverage eﬀect”, are ﬁrst documented in this
study.
[Insert Table IV here]
Using simultaneous regression, Table IV formally veriﬁes that the ability of indus-
try concentration and industry leverage to explain long-term returns is truly novel,
and cannot be explained by controls for other variables known to predict long-term
returns. In order to avoid bias from pseudo market timing (as discussed in Schultz
(2001)), we use the Fama-MacBeth regression method, which applies a weight of
one to each year in our sample.16 The dependent variable is the three-year post-
IPO abnormal return of each IPO from 1984 to 2000. As in Tables III, we deﬁne
long-term abnormal returns using four diﬀerent asset pricing models, and the results
are reported in Panels A to D. Because equity volatility, the leverage ratio, and the
book-to-market ratio are highly correlated, we examine separate speciﬁcations for
these variables.
Table IV also controls for the results of existing studies. For example, the table
16Hence, we do not overweight observations in IPO clusters. Not reported, results are similar but
slightly stronger when we use OLS instead of the Fama-MacBeth method.
16conﬁrms the Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) result that long-term IPO performance
is positively related to the Carter-Manaster Rank. This result is economically large
and robust (1) across all four asset pricing models and (2) across samples that include
or exclude the late 1990s. Similarly, the positive and signiﬁcant overhang coeﬃcient
reported in the table conﬁrms the Jain and Kini (1994) result that issuers who re-
tain more equity experience IPOs with superior long-term performance. Although
not reported to conserve space, we also ﬁnd that past IPO volume does not signiﬁ-
cantly predict long-term performance. This conﬁrms Lowry (2003)’s result showing
that past IPO volume, though it can predict raw long-term returns, cannot pre-
dict abnormal long-term returns. Also not reported, we ﬁnd support for Ritter and
Welch (2002)’s result showing that an IPO’s initial return does not reliably predict
its long-term abnormal performance.
Panels A, B and C of Table IV document (1) a signiﬁcant negative relationship
between industry concentration and long-term performance, (2) a signiﬁcant neg-
ative relationship between industry leverage and long-term performance, and (3) a
signiﬁcant positive relationship between equity volatility and long-term performance.
Panel D additionally establishes that (4) industry concentration and industry lever-
age do not signiﬁcantly predict industry-adjusted abnormal returns. Thus, existing
public ﬁrms in either concentrated or leveraged industries perform just as poorly
(or just as well) as their corresponding IPO ﬁrms. In contrast, Panel D shows that
equity volatility does signiﬁcantly predict industry adjusted abnormal returns, and
IPOs in more volatile industries outperform their industry peers. Hence, the abnor-
mal performance attributed to industry volatility is unique to IPO ﬁrms in these
industries. All results are robust to the inclusion of variables known to predict long-
term performance, and are also robust to including or excluding the late 1990s from
the sample.
B Non IPO Firms
Tables III and IV document that IPO ﬁrms and existing ﬁrms alike in concentrated
industries, underperform relative to ﬁrms in less concentrated industries. This result
17is economically large, and robust to several methods for computing abnormal returns.
However, as discussed, we can only conclude that this result obtains conditional on
observing a positive number of IPOs in a given industry. To fully understand the
link between concentration, the existence of IPOs, and long term performance, it
is thus useful to ask whether concentration can explain performance in industries
that experience no IPOs at all. Table VI addresses this question. One observation
is one three digit SIC code industry, and an industry is included in our sample in
year t if it experienced zero IPOs in year t-1. Industries ﬁtting this description are
then separately grouped into terciles based on their December of year t-2 industry
leverage and industry concentration (size HHI), and the table reports the long-term
(three-year) performance of ﬁrms in industries in each grouping.
Table VI shows that non-IPO industries do not experience abnormal returns that
vary signiﬁcantly versus industry leverage or industry concentration groupings. The
average returns, both along the diagonal, and oﬀ the diagonal, do not vary in a
statistically signiﬁcant, nor in an economically signiﬁcant, fashion. We conclude
that the reported abnormal performance of ﬁrms in high concentration industries is
speciﬁc to industries that actually experience IPOs. We draw the same conclusion
for the industry leverage eﬀect. In section D, we discuss the importance of this result
further.
C Examples
Table V displays three examples of the negative relationship between industry con-
centration and long-term abnormal returns. The miscellaneous plastics industry
exempliﬁes the main idea. Prior to 1988, the industry was highly concentrated with
just one existing public ﬁrm. Over the next decade, (1) ﬁrms continued to enter,
(2) long term abnormal returns were sharply negative, and (3) the industry’s con-
centration declined steadily. However, concentration ﬁnally leveled oﬀ at a more
competitive level toward the end of the sample, and only then did long-term ab-
normal returns become somewhat positive. The women’s clothing store industry
experienced a concentration averaging 0.6 until the late 1990s. During this time,
18the average abnormal three year post-IPO return was roughly -50%. By 1998, the
industry’s concentration declined to 0.5, and the 1998 IPO experienced abnormal
three-year performance of +59%. The investment advice industry exhibits a similar
pattern. The ﬁve IPOs issued in 1992 when concentration was 0.54, experienced ab-
normal performance averaging -16.4%. In contrast, the seven IPOs issued from 1995
to 1999, when the concentration was a more competitive 0.20, experienced abnormal
performance of roughly +60%.
D Discussion
In this section, we established that IPOs in concentrated industries underperform
relative to those in less concentrated industries. Moreover, the size of this underper-
formance is large, and post IPO abnormal returns generally exceed 35% over three
years regardless of the asset pricing model used, and regardless of whether the late
1990s are included in the sample. In this section, we explore possible explanations,
and discuss both risk based and behavioral theories.
Seminal theories including the capital asset pricing model and the arbitrage pric-
ing theory suggest that diﬀerences in stock performance can arise from heterogeneous
risk exposure. Although we cannot rule out risk, four items suggest that these ex-
planations are less likely. (1) We ﬁnd that abnormal returns persist in cross section
even after controlling for known risk factors including market returns (MKT), size
(SMB), and book to market risk (HML).17 (2) We ﬁnd that ﬁrms in highly concen-
trated industries with zero IPOs do not underperform. Hence, concentration-based
underperformance is conditional on observing IPOs in a given industry, so indus-
try concentration, in itself, is not a priced risk factor. The conditional nature of
this result also suggests that exposure to these stocks is easy to diversify, making
it less likely that they are associated with priced risk. (3) The magnitude of the
observed underperformance may be too large to be explained by risk alone. IPOs
in concentrated industries underperform by roughly 12% per year, an amount that
is larger than even the average equity premium during this period. (4) Fama and
17Although not reported, we also ﬁnd that momentum cannot explain the observed diﬀerences
in abnormal returns.
19French (1993) suggest that market returns (MKT), size (SMB), and book to market
(HML) explain the majority of common “priced variance” in stock returns, leaving
little room for an undiscovered risk factor pervasive enough to explain the observed
return diﬀerentials.
We conclude that our results are a mystery given the current state of the asset
pricing literature, and that the bar is placed high for admissible risk-based expla-
nations. Regardless, the most plausible explanation based on risk is motivated by
Gort and Klepper (1982), Jovanovic (1982), Klepper and Grady (1990), Klepper
(1996), and Maksimovic and Phillips (2004) among others, who suggest that indus-
tries go through life cycles. In bad times, competitive industries are more likely to
consolidate, and ﬁrms are more likely to become distressed. Hence, ﬁrms in com-
petitive industries may be exposed to (systematic) macroeconomic risk, and ﬁrms
in concentrated industries may be oﬀsetting hedges. This explanation would predict
that ﬁrms in concentrated industries will have lower expected returns than ﬁrms
in competitive industries. However, this explanation has diﬃculty explaining why
underperformance in concentrated industries is conditional on IPOs being issued.
Also, this hypothesis cannot explain the link between industry concentration and
IPO volume. This theory is also diﬃcult to test because IPO data are only available
from periods of relative economic growth.
Because the bar is placed high for risk based explanations, it is prudent to consider
behavioral explanations, especially those that appeal due to their simplicity.18 One
explanation that both satisﬁes the simplicity requirement, and is consistent with all of
the ﬁndings we report in our study, is the following: the observed decision to issue an
IPO reveals information about future industrial organization, and investors overlook
this information. The presence of information revelation, especially in concentrated
industries, becomes clear in the context of the industrial organization literature.
It is well known among scholars of industrial organization that ﬁrms in concen-
trated industries face less competition from rivals, and typically enjoy relatively high
proﬁt margins. In practice, high proﬁt margins can only persist in equilibrium when
18Simple explanations appeal to Occam’s Razor: researchers should favor simple explanations in
favor of more complicated ones.
20rivals cannot enter due to (1) high costs of entry, (2) economies of scale, or (3) legal
(i.e. patent) protection. Hence, high proﬁt equilibria can be unstable in a dynamic
economy, and observing successful entry should alert investors to the fact that the
existing barriers to entry may be failing.19 Because failing barriers to entry imply
that future competition is likely to increase, investors should downwardly update
their beliefs about future proﬁts, and drive stock prices lower after observing en-
try. This price correction should be large, as successful entry by even a single ﬁrm
likely implies that several additional ﬁrms may also rush to enter, greatly increasing
competition in the coming months.
The logic of this explanation mirrors Myers and Majluf (1984), who show that
observing a corporate ﬁnance decision (i.e. issuing equity) contains value-relevant
information about a ﬁrm’s growth options. In the case of industry concentration, a
similar corporate ﬁnancing decision (issuing an IPO) contains value-relevant infor-
mation about an industry as a whole, not just a single ﬁrm. If investors ignore, or are
not aware of, this industry-wide information content, the aforementioned downward
price correction would occur later, when observed proﬁt levels reﬂect the expected
increase in competition. Here, it is easy to see why all of our study’s key results
arise when investors ignore this information content: (1) underperformance of IPOs
in concentrated industries, (2) existing public ﬁrms in these same industries under-
perform by just as much as the IPO ﬁrms, (3) Concentrated industries experiencing
zero IPOs do not underperform, (4) IPO volume is higher in concentrated industries
(see section III), consistent with herding of entrants.
Given well-known facts regarding how today’s investors value ﬁrms, it is easy
understand why investors may indeed overlook the information content of IPOs.
Arkebauer and Schultz (1991) and Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) suggest
that underwriters and investors alike value ﬁrms using comparable ﬁrm ratios. The
problem with this method is that ratios are based on current proﬁt levels (primarily
because this is all that is available). Hence, investors using ratios to value IPO ﬁrms
in concentrated industries are assuming that they will enjoy the same high proﬁt
19For example, technological innovation or changes in the legal environment can render patents
to be irrelevant, lower the costs of entry, or destroy economies of scale.
21margins of the past. This form of valuation error would later correct over time in
the form of abnormal returns, as observed, when the eﬀects of increased competition
begin to appear in reported earnings.
In this section, we also documented that IPOs in highly leveraged industries un-
derperform relative to IPOs issued in less leveraged industries. The same arguments
presented for industry concentration also suggest that risk exposure alone likely can-
not explain this result,20 so behavioral explanations should be considered. Unlike
industry concentration, however, several behavioral explanations may be at work.
For example, this “leverage eﬀect” may arise from the aforementioned “concentra-
tion eﬀect”, as valuation errors become magniﬁed in leveraged industries because
increased competition impacts entire ﬁrms, not just the portion ﬁnanced by equity.
The leverage eﬀect might also be explained by a higher likelihood of predation. In
particular, a highly leveraged entrant may be more sensitive to predation, so preda-
tion may occur more frequently. The act of predation is costly, so the IPO ﬁrm and
existing ﬁrms alike, may underperform over the three year horizon that we examine
in leveraged industries. Finally, high leverage may also proxy for fewer growth op-
tions. Here, underperformance may arise due to decreased investor enthusiasm for
these less glamorous value industries.
III IPO Volume
Ibbotson and Jaﬀe (1975) document that IPO volume is highly correlated in time
series. Lowry (2003) ﬁnds that capital demands and investor sentiment drive much of
the variation in IPO volume. Because, as discussed, declining barriers to entry may
predict the arrival of multiple entrants within concentrated industries, it is natural to
ask whether industry concentration can predict future industry-speciﬁc IPO volume.
This section explores this question.
20This result also only obtains conditional on observing IPOs, and existing public ﬁrms in highly
leveraged industries perform just as poorly as these IPOs do.
22A Results
[Insert Table VII here]
Table VII reports the results from Fama-MacBeth regressions21 predicting industry-
speciﬁc IPO volume. One observation is one industry in a calendar year, and the
dependent variable is its number of IPOs in year t divided by its number of existing
public ﬁrms at the end of year t-1. Each industry is deﬁned by its three-digit SIC
code.
Perhaps the most interesting result in Table VII is the stable, positive relationship
between industry concentration and IPO volume. A one standard deviation (0.21)
increase in an industry’s concentration based on market capitalization (Size HHI), is
associated with a roughly 0.7% increase in IPO volume.22 This eﬀect is statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% level, and is robust to controls for variables known to predict
IPO volume. It is also somewhat larger when we exclude the late 1990s. We conclude
that IPO ﬁrms arrive more frequently in concentrated industries. The results are
similar for industry concentration based on sales (not reported).
The table also conﬁrms the results of existing studies, but on an industry-speciﬁc
basis. For example, prior industry-speciﬁc IPO volume is an important predictor
of future IPO volume, both statistically and economically. A one standard devia-
tion (0.20) increase in prior industry-speciﬁc IPO volume results in a roughly 2.2%
increase in future IPO volume. This ﬁnding suggests that IPO volume is not only
autocorrelated market-wide, as documented by Ibbotson and Jaﬀe (1975), but it is
also autocorrelated at the industry level. This result also supports Benninga, Hel-
mantel, and Sarig (2003)’s theoretical prediction that IPOs tend to cluster within
industries.
Similar to ﬁndings in Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) and Lowry (2003), we
21We use Fama-MacBeth regressions because we focus on cross-sectional analysis, not time-series
analysis. Results are similar if we use a dynamic panel data treatment (not reported).
22We also include industry-year observations in which there is no IPO activity (and assign such
observations an IPO volume of zero) to ensure that the results are not inﬂuenced by selection bias.
Thus, unlike the correlation coeﬃcients in Table II (which are based on industry-years in which
IPOs actually occur), the data for Table VII includes annual observations for all industries.
23also ﬁnd a negative relationship between the industry book-to-market ratio and IPO
volume. A one standard deviation (0.45) increase in the logarithm of the industry
book-to-market ratio results in a 0.9% decrease in industry-speciﬁc IPO volume. Also
conﬁrming results in Lowry (2003), we ﬁnd that prior industry returns are positively
related to future IPO volume. The size of the average ﬁrm also matters, and is
negatively related to IPO volume.
Ibbotson and Jaﬀe (1975) also show, perhaps surprisingly, that past initial returns
do not predict IPO volume on a market-wide basis. However, we ﬁnd that industry-
speciﬁc past abnormal initial returns do predict IPO volume. The average R-squared
from the Fama/MacBeth regressions in Table VII is roughly 11%, suggesting that
much of the cross-sectional variation in industry-speciﬁc IPO volume is predictable.
B Discussion
The fact that higher concentration predicts higher IPO volume further supports
the existence of information content associated with observing IPO issuance. In
particular, this link between volume and industry concentration is predicted when
investors ignore the information relevant to an industry’s future organization, as
discussed in section II. This section speciﬁcally supports the prediction that multiple
entrants will arrive in concentrated industries when barriers to entry begin to erode.
IV Conclusion
We ﬁnd that IPOs issued in more competitive, and more highly leveraged, industries
underperform in the three years following their issuance. Both results are statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% level, and are robust to four diﬀerent asset pricing models for
computing abnormal returns, to including or excluding the late 1990s, and to controls
for variables known to predict the long-term performance of IPOs.
We also design tests to trace the economic sources of this underperformance. Al-
though possible explanations are not mutually exclusive, and more than one may
apply, our evidence most strongly supports a (behavioral) mispricing explanation
24based on the information content of IPO issuance: observing the decision to issue
an IPO reveals information about future industrial organization, and investors sys-
tematically overlook this information. The logic of this explanation mirrors Myers
and Majluf (1984), who show that observing a corporate ﬁnance decision (i.e. is-
suing equity) contains value-relevant information about a ﬁrm’s growth options. In
the case of industry concentration, a similar corporate ﬁnancing decision (issuing an
IPO) contains value-relevant information about an industry as a whole, not just a
single ﬁrm. In particular, observing an IPO indicates that long-standing barriers to
entry may be failing, and additional multiple entrants may soon arrive, increasing
competition and lowering proﬁt margins in the near future.
If investors systematically overlook the information content of IPO issuance, the
resulting long-term price correction can explain all of our study’s key ﬁndings: (1)
underperformance of IPOs in concentrated industries, (2) existing public ﬁrms in
these same industries underperform by just as much as the IPO ﬁrms, (3) Concen-
trated industries experiencing zero IPOs do not underperform, and (4) IPO volume
is higher in concentrated industries (consistent with herding of entrants). However,
it is important to note that explanations for this “concentration eﬀect” and “leverage
eﬀect” are not mutually exclusive. To this end, we believe that future researchers
might do well to search for additional links between corporate ﬁnancing decisions,
information content, investor mispricing, and associated risk factors.
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28Table I: Summary statistics
Explanation: Summary statistics are reported for IPOs issued in the US from 1984 to 2000 excluding: ﬁrms with
an issue price less than ﬁve dollars, ADRs, ﬁnancial ﬁrms, and REITs. raw buy-and-hold return is an IPO’s
actual buy and hold return for the three year period after its IPO. style-matched buy-and-hold abnormal
returns are equal to an IPO’s actual three-year raw return less the three-year return of a style-matched benchmark
portfolio, where matching is based on 10 size and 5 book to market portfolios with NYSE breakpoints = 50
benchmark portfolios. style-matched cumulative abnormal returns are the abnormal monthly returns relative
to the benchmark, accumulated over the 36 months following an IPO. style-matched calendar time abnormal
returns are the average monthly abnormal returns (multiplied by 36 for convenience) using the same benchmark
for four quartile portfolios that span each sample period. Each quartile portfolio has rotating membership and a
given IPO enters its respective quartile portfolio in the month of its issuance and exits after its three-year
anniversary. Fama-French three-factor abnormal returns are the intercept (multiplied by 36 for convenience)
of Fama/French time series regressions, where each stock’s excess returns are regressed on the market factor, the
HML factor, and the SMB factor. Industry-matched buy-and-hold abnormal returns are equal to an IPO’s
actual three-year return less the equal-weighted average three-year return of all existing public ﬁrms in the given
IPO’s industry (based on three-digit SIC codes). Initial Return (IR), is the implied return from the IPO price to
the after market trading price. PastIR30 is the average underpricing for all IPOs issued in the 30 day window
preceding the issue date. CMrank is the Carter-Manaster rank as listed in Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) and
updated by Jay Ritter. Overhang is equal to the pre-IPO shares retained by the issuer divided by the shares ﬁled,
both primary and secondary. LogSize is the natural logarithm of the original ﬁling amount. For an IPO issued in
year t, average industry characteristics are equal-weighted averages of the given quantity over all existing public
ﬁrms in the IPO’s given three-digit SIC industry, over the twelve-month period from July, year t-2 to June, year t-1.
Std. Min- Med- Max- Obser-
Variable Description Mean Dev. imum ian imum vations
Post IPO Three-Year Abnormal Returns
Rawret Raw 3-year buy and hold return 0.227 2.146 –0.999 –0.291 52.341 4,980
Styret (B+H) Style matched buy and hold return –0.001 2.170 –3.581 –0.458 52.098 4,980
Styret (Cum.) Style matched cumulative return –0.051 1.255 –4.750 0.018 9.848 4,980
FFalpha Fama and French three factor return 0.084 1.411 –6.391 0.023 10.747 4,608
Indret Industry matched buy and hold return –0.096 2.076 –6.236 –0.458 51.645 4,980
Price Variables
IR Initial returns 0.209 0.453 –0.404 0.071 6.975 4,980
PastIR30 Average IR 30 days before IPO 0.117 0.060 0.065 0.096 0.425 4,980
CMrank Lead UW’s Carter/Manaster rank 7.198 2.068 0.000 8.000 9.000 4,980
Overhang Shares retained / shares ﬁled 2.932 2.031 0.000 2.439 31.692 4,980
LogSize Natural Logarithm of ﬁling amount 18.504 1.190 15.071 18.458 24.572 4,980
Average Characteristics of Existing Public Firms
Size HHI Herﬁndahl based on market cap 0.243 0.209 0.010 0.168 1.000 4,980
Sales HHI Herﬁndahl based on sales 0.214 0.191 0.019 0.161 1.000 4,980
Leverage Ratio Debt / debt plus market cap 0.217 0.127 0.000 0.189 0.842 4,980
Equity Volatility Monthly return std deviation 0.166 0.049 0.029 0.165 1.393 4,980
Share Turnover Share volume / shares outstanding 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 4,980
Proﬁtability Operating income / sales 0.117 0.063 0.000 0.103 0.752 4,980
Book/Market Log of book to market ratio –5.493 0.430 –9.130 –5.491 –3.551 4,980
Firm Size Log of normalized market cap 5.842 1.180 –1.060 5.903 9.964 4,980
Prior Returns One year stock return, t-1 0.055 0.290 –0.892 0.008 2.673 4,980









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































35Table VI: Long-term Performance of Non-IPO industries versus industry concentra-
tion and industry leverage
Explanation: The table displays the average abnormal performance of non-IPO industries versus industry
concentration and industry leverage. Initially, one observation is one three digit SIC code industry, and an industry
is included in our sample in year t if it experienced zero IPOs in year t-1. Industries ﬁtting this description are then
separately grouped into terciles based on their December of year t-2 levels of industry leverage and industry
concentration (size HHI). Size HHI is the industry’s concentration, computed as the Herﬁndahl index (sum of
squared market shares of existing public ﬁrms), where each ﬁrm’s market share is its CRSP market capitalization
at the end of year t-1 divided by the total market capitalization of all existing public ﬁrms within the given
industry. An industry’s Leverage ratio is the book value of short-term and long-term debt divided by (market
cap + book value of debt), averaged over ﬁrms in the given industry. For industries falling into each of the nine
tercile groupings, we then compute their average abnormal three year returns using three methods. style-matched
buy-and-hold abnormal returns are based on 10 size and 5 book to market portfolios with NYSE breakpoints
= 50 benchmark portfolios. style-matched cumulative abnormal returns are monthly abnormal returns
cumulated over the 36 months in each period. In Panel C, Fama-French three-factor abnormal returns are
the intercept (multiplied by 36 for convenience) of Fama/French time-series regressions, where each stock’s excess
returns are regressed on the market factor, the HML factor, and the SMB factor.
Least Middle Most
Size HHI Leveraged Leveraged Leveraged
Grouping Tercile Tercile Tercile
Panel A: style-matched Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns
Least Concentrated –1.4 –6.7 -1.3
Middle Tercile –9.6 –7.0 –3.5
Most Concentrated –4.4 –10.0 –5.5
Panel B: style-matched Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Least Concentrated 5.6 –1.0 –2.1
Middle Tercile –1.0 –3.3 –3.2
Most Concentrated 8.6 –6.9 6.3
Panel C: fama-french three-factor Abnormal Returns
Least Concentrated 7.3 –1.3 3.2
Middle Tercile 6.8 6.9 –3.5
Most Concentrated 14.4 3.7 3.7
36T
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